Temporary Afghan Special Immigrant Visas Program Untenable
Following the closure of Embassy Kabul, numerous Afghan Special Immigrant Visas, more commonly known as “SIVs”, have been issued by the Department of State under a temporary program designed to reward faithful service to the U.S. for those employed “by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government”. While the aim of the program is laudable, the eligibility of applicants for these visas is incredibly difficult to verify. Authenticating employment documents, ruling out other visa ineligibilities, establishing the family ties of derivative applicants, and uncovering fraud are all very difficult to do at arm’s length. In some cases, applicants who had been denied a visa at U.S. Embassy Kabul for fraud received approval to interview again based on a second, equally fraudulent application.
A great illustration of how broken the Afghan SIV process has become is the case of Dilbar Gul Taj Khan, who received a SIV in March of 2024. After being denied an SIV in 2016, Taj Khan changed his name to “Dilbar Gul Dilbar” and submitted a new fraudulent application in 2021. Taj Kahn received his visa despite having submitted a counterfeit letter of approval from the State Department, a fraudulent letter of employment, and a fraudulent Letter of Recommendation, all of which are required documents for the process. Were Embassy Kabul still in operation, this failure likely would not have happened.
Because of the high number of spurious applications for SIVs, the Consular section at Embassy Kabul relied heavily on Embassy Kabul’s Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) to stay one step ahead of the latest fraud trends. The FPU team, which was staffed by both local experts and members of the Foreign Service, uncovered numerous crimes perpetrated by foreign and American actors. One concrete result of their work was the arrest and conviction of Jeromy Pittmann, who assisted over 100 unqualified applicants obtain SIVs for payment.
Unfortunately, four years have passed since Embassy Kabul conducted its last visa interview. The members of Embassy Kabul’s FPU have been reassigned. The Consular Officers with direct experience in Afghanistan have been reassigned. Those adjudicating SIVs now do not have the experience, training, and up-to-date information on Afghan fraud trends, and they have no FPU backup to verify details on the ground. There is simply no way that the Officer handling an SIV case can confidently assert that any given applicant is bona fide, as illustrated by the previously mentioned Dilbar Gul Taj Khan case.
Even when all of the documentation has been verified to the best of the Consular officer’s ability, there are still serious programmatic risks that are now unable to be mitigated due to the closure of Embassy Kabul. Due to the extraordinary nature of the Afghan SIV program and the high number of fraudulent applications, each prospective applicant must submit certain documentation for consideration. Among them is the aforementioned Letter of Recommendation from a direct supervisor, which affirms that the applicant indeed was employed on behalf of the U.S. government, gives the nature of their employment, and includes other key details. The intent of the letter was for a U.S. citizen who personally knew the applicant to vouch for them, and, although there undoubtedly were U.S. citizens such as Pittmann who engaged in malfeasance, this requirement helped prevent rampant fraud. The State Department eliminated this requirement in the fall of 2021.
It appears that it is now possible for the entire application process for an SIV to be vouched for by non-U.S. citizens. This is concerning for two reasons. The first is the possible that terrorist organizations can suborn the process, putting pressure on companies that worked with the United States in the pats to vouch for their own assets. The second is that every single actor in the chain could be located in Afghanistan, where they can commit fraud with zero risk of being arrested and tried for their crimes. Since laws are made to “keep honest people honest”, how many more Jeromy Pittmanns would there have been were it not for the fear of arrest and prosecution?
Speaking of Mr. Pittmann, his crimes exposed a fundamental flaw in the SIV process that cannot be fully mitigated even with a robust FPU unit active in Afghanistan. After an applicant receives their Letter of Recommendation and submits their other documentation, they still must pass a background check and show that they possess no other visa ineligibilities. If it is difficult for the Consular Officer adjudicating the visa to verify documentation created and submitted by an American supervisor, consider how much more difficult it is to ascertain the veracity of documents purportedly issued by the local government. Afghanistan is on the list of countries subject to a full ban on entry by Presidential Proclamation, and for good reasons. Obtaining reliable background checks and police records is impossible in Afghanistan as there is rampant document fraud and no way to verify the provided documents against centralized databases. And now, without Embassy Kabul’s extensive fraud database being updated regularly, the risk of granting an unqualified applicant a visa grows every day.
The temporary Afghan SIV program had its time and its place, but we must not let nostalgia or wishful thinking cloud our judgment in this matter. The Afghans who served America faithfully are largely resettled in the United States. Far too many of those still seeking an SIV are fraudulent actors who have no place among the American people. Our first duty is not to the people of Afghanistan, but to the people of the United States. That is why it is time to immediately pause the program for review. Once appropriate management controls are in place, the program should be limited to those who provided direct services to the U.S. Armed Forces or Embassy personnel such as interpretation and the requirement that an American citizen sign the Letter of Recommendation should be reinstated. This change allows us to reward those who worked directly for the U.S. government, while reducing the chance for fraudulent applications to slip through.
