David H. Rundell
October 23, 2026
For a quarter century revolutionary France covered Europe with tears, ashes and graves until it was decisively defeated and regional peace restored. Revolutionary Iran has done much the same in the Middle East for nearly half a century, but has yet to be defeated. First Britain and then the United States sought to contain these two revolutions without costly wars. William Pitt the Younger conceded nearly everything France demanded in order to secure the Peace of Amiens. Barak Obama did likewise to secure his Iran nuclear deal. Neither of these agreements lasted long. In 2023 Saudi Arabia sought to normalize relations with Iran, yet today Iranian proxies are burning Saudi airports and oil pipelines. As Winston Churchill noted “you can not negotiate with a crocodile”. That advice matters to a global economy that still depends on Saudi oil.
Other similarities between the French and Iranian revolutions are obvious. Both began as local events, grew to destabilize entire regions and ultimately involved the great power of the day. Both were driven by transformative ideologies, one secular, the other explicitly religious. Both were nationalist movements seeking regional hegemony and both explicitly opposed monarchies. Since 1979, revolutionary Iran has been a persistent and blatant threat to the Arab Gulf monarchies. It considers their royal families un-Islamic, illegitimate, American puppets. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini explicitly called for their overthrow. At various times Iran has supported local uprisings by Shi’a muslims in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait.
Tehran has also sought to encircle the Gulf monarchies with a network of armed proxies. These include: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Hashd al-l Shabi militias in Iraq and of course the Houthis in Yemen. All of these groups have engaged in terrorism designed to destabilize the region and expanded Iranian influence. Moreover, Tehran continues to challenge Saudi control of Mecca, and it would be naive to think it has abandoned its nuclear ambitions.
The Gulf states initially sought to remain neutral in the current conflict. They banned the use of their airspace and bases for offensive operations against Iran. Some went so far as to block American refueling, reconnaissance and even search and rescue flights. It did them no good. All have seen their cities and energy infrastructure attacked by Iran and its proxies. You can not negotiate with a crocodile.
Saudi Arabia’s problems with Yemen are not new. For 90 years it has faced a series of border disputes, proxy wars and military conflicts with its southern neighbor. The 1934 Treaty of Taif granted Saudi Arabia control over three border provinces which the Houthis still regard as rightfully theirs. A 1962 military coup overthrew Yemen’s monarchy and established a republic. Saudi Arabia backed the royalist in a brutal civil war. Egypt’s President Gamal sent tens of thousands of troops to support the new republican government and made it clear that his next target was the Saudi monarchy. The United States sent aircraft to project Saudi Arabia from Egyptian bombers. Israel quietly assisted the royalists and their Saudi allies.
Like the Palestinians, Yemen backed Iraq in its 1990 when it invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia. In response the Saudis expelled nearly a million Yemeni guest workers and cut off financial aid for a decade. The 2011 Arab Spring facilitated the Houthi’s campaign to topple Yemen’s republican government and seize the capital in Sana’a. This time it was Iran that backed the Shi’a muslim Houthis while Saudi Arabia has continued to back the internationally recognized government in Yemen’s ongoing civil war.
Iran, and more recently China, have provided the Houthis with missile and drone parts used to strike deep into Saudi territory. They have targeted oil infrastructure, regional airports and Saudi oil shipments through the Bab el-Mandeb. Last week they badly damaged Riyadh’s international airport as well as Aramco’s headquarters in Dhahran. These attacks totally disrupted a Riyadh conference that many of the world’s leading oil executives had planned to attend.
Saudi Arabia is wealthy nation with a lot to lose, but limited capacity to defend itself. Its deep commitment to regional stability and strong ties to the West are diametrically opposed to Iran’s ambitions. It is embarked on Vision 2030, an ambitious program of economic and social reform intended to diversify its oil-dependent economy and modernize its social norms. The kingdom’s future depends on the success of this project which in turn depends of domestic security, and foreign investment. Both of these are now threatened by the Houthis.
Every American President since Franklin Roosevelt has in some way promised American support for the defense of Saudi Arabia. The Obama Administration began supporting the Saudis against the Houthis with logistics, targeting intelligence, and refueling operations. The Biden Administration vacillated. In an ill-fated effort to improve relations with Iran, Biden took the Houthis off the terrorist list and canceled some military support to Saudi Arabia.
When the Houthis began attacking Israel and Red Sea shipping, the Biden team put them back on the terrorist list. It subsequently coordinated a multinational air campaign against the Houthis which the recently snubbed Saudis declined to join. Operation Prosperity Guardian was a tactical success, but a strategic failure that left the Houthis in place.
Iran is becoming increasingly desperate. The American blockade has effectively ended its oil exports. At the same time, the U.S. Navy has coordinated the “Hormuz Shuttle” which in combination with pipeline flows has largely restored Saudi oil exports to prewar levels. Time is not on Tehran’s side and the Houthis are one of its few remaining cards.
For multiple reasons it remains unrealistic to expect that the United States will provide the sustained air campaign or boots on the ground needed to topple the Houthis. The Trump Administration continues to provide the Saudis with intelligence and targeting advice, but it has rejected requests for American airstrikes against the Houthis. There is no public support in the United States for another open-ended Middle East conflict. American forces and logistics are not limitless. Saudi oil is getting to global markets. The Pentagon understands that previous air campaigns failed to dislodge the Houthis. And finally, the Houthis have assured Washington that they will not target American shipping in the Red Sea.
While the United States remains the only power that can ultimately cut of the head of the snake in Tehran, there is only one nation that can effectively help the Saudis confront the Houthis today. Israel has both the ability and the willingness to destroy the Houthi’s not only with airstrikes but more importantly with ground operations to organize anti-Houthi forces in Yemen’s ongoing civil war.
Saudi Arabia has cooperated with Israel on a limited scale many times in the past. It will no doubt continue to do so clandestinely. On the other hand, the Saudis may come to accept that Tehran is a far greater threat to them than Jerusalem. Could they consider more robust cooperation with Israel? The Saudis are at war with Yemen, and the Americans are not coming with boots on the ground or a sustained air campaign. Neither are Pakistan or Turkey. Only the Israelis is willing to make such a commitment but that would require more open cooperation. The Saudis need to ask themselves whether it is still worth risking their own vulnerable prosperity and security for an essentially sentimental commitment to Palestine. I know how the kingdom’s founder Ibn Saud would have replied. Without security you have nothing.
David Rundell is a former Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Riyadh and the author of Vision or Mirage, Saudi Arabia at the Crossroads.
