A Concerned Foreign Service Officer
November 7, 2026
The Trump administration has undertaken one of the most significant reforms of American foreign assistance in decades. By dismantling USAID and transferring important responsibilities to the State Department, the administration has an opportunity to replace an unwieldy bureaucracy with a more focused, accountable system that advances American national interests.
But organizational restructuring alone will not guarantee success. The administration must also confront a fundamental personnel question: Are the people now entrusted with implementing these reforms capable of delivering the changes the administration expects?
That question deserves particular attention at the State Department's Bureau of Disaster and Humanitarian Response (DHR), which has rehired a number of former USAID employees as Foreign Service Officers, limited non-career appointees, and contractors.
Many former USAID employees have valuable experience and deserve consideration for these positions. But previous service at USAID should not confer an automatic claim to leadership in the new system. Management competence, professional conduct, accountability, and a demonstrated willingness to implement lawful administration policies must be the standards.
Reports from several overseas DHR offices raise troubling questions about whether those standards are being consistently applied.
Dominican Republic: Professional Conduct and Management
In the Dominican Republic, concerns have emerged about the professional conduct and management capabilities of a former USAID employee now serving in DHR.
According to accounts from colleagues, the employee has repeatedly engaged in confrontational exchanges during Microsoft Teams meetings, criticized supervisors and fellow employees, and contributed to a workplace environment in which some colleagues reportedly prefer to avoid working with her.
There have also been allegations of inappropriate remarks about members of the Ben Franklin Fellowship, including suggestions that these employees should be professionally targeted. Such claims are serious and should be investigated rather than treated as ordinary workplace disagreements.
The issue extends beyond interpersonal conduct. Questions have also been raised about the employee's program-management experience and the quality of assistance proposals developed under her responsibility.
Meanwhile, the reported transfer of six Foreign Service National employees from Haiti to the Dominican Republic raises questions about staffing priorities and the justification for expanding DHR's overseas presence.
Who is reviewing these personnel and program decisions? What standards are being applied, and who is accountable when problems arise?
Panama: Complaints Should Not Disappear With a Transfer
The situation in Panama raises an equally important concern.
A former USAID employee now assigned there reportedly faced formal workplace complaints during an earlier posting in Colombia. According to the accounts provided, those complaints involved allegations of favoritism, disrespectful treatment of Foreign Service National employees, and poor management practices.
These allegations require verification, and the employee deserves fair treatment. Nevertheless, DHR leadership should be able to answer several straightforward questions: Were the complaints investigated? What were the findings? Were any corrective measures recommended? And were those findings considered before the employee received a new assignment?
Transferring an employee should never become a substitute for addressing legitimate management concerns.
Now, according to reports from the field, the Panama office is seeking additional personnel while its geographic responsibilities may be expanded to include El Salvador and Honduras.
Such expansion might be justified by genuine operational requirements. But DHR leadership in Washington should explain the need, demonstrate the expected benefits, and establish clear measures of success.
The administration set out to reform foreign assistance, not simply to recreate USAID's organizational structure under another name.
There is also the continuing question of DHR's reliance on United Nations agencies, including UNICEF, UNHCR, and the Food and Agriculture Organization. These institutions may be appropriate partners in some circumstances, but their use should be justified by performance, cost-effectiveness, transparency, and measurable results.
The objective must be better foreign assistance—not the preservation of familiar bureaucratic relationships.
Costa Rica: Favoritism and the Responsibilities of Leadership
Perhaps the most pointed questions about personnel management concern the DHR office in Costa Rica.
A former USAID personal services contractor was appointed to an office director position despite reported concerns about her limited supervisory experience. According to accounts from colleagues, she had previously managed no more than one employee.
Prior contractor status should not disqualify anyone from leadership. But managing a substantial overseas operation requires demonstrated supervisory ability, sound judgment, and the confidence of one's staff. Those qualifications should be established before an appointment is made—not assumed afterward.
More troubling are allegations that temporary duty assignments to Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, and U.S. Southern Command have favored individuals with personal connections to the office director.
Temporary duty opportunities are valuable professional assignments. They should be distributed according to mission requirements, qualifications, and transparent selection criteria. If personal relationships are influencing these decisions, DHR has a management problem that deserves immediate attention.
There are also reported complaints from Foreign Service National employees about the director's leadership, along with questions about her telework schedule and availability during normal office hours. These claims should be assessed against actual attendance records, Department policies, and documented performance expectations.
But the larger issue concerns Washington's response. According to the accounts provided, DHR management has been made aware of concerns about the office's leadership without taking action that employees regard as adequate.
That allegation deserves particular scrutiny.
An employee's shortcomings are ultimately a supervisory responsibility. If Washington knows of serious management problems and fails to address them, accountability cannot stop at the overseas office.
Sri Lanka: Professional Responsibility and Program Integrity
In Sri Lanka, a former USAID employee has reportedly participated in online discussions sharply criticizing DHR leadership and administration policies. Concerns have also been raised about the feasibility and quality of assistance proposals associated with her work.
The Department must distinguish between legitimate personal expression and conduct that violates professional obligations. Federal employees have rights, and disagreement with an administration's policies does not by itself constitute misconduct.
Nevertheless, employees entrusted with designing and administering foreign-assistance programs have a clear obligation to carry out approved policies competently and in good faith.
If program proposals are poorly conceived, inadequately supported, or unlikely to succeed, supervisors should identify those deficiencies through rigorous review. If there is credible evidence that an employee has deliberately undermined assigned responsibilities, the Department should investigate through established procedures.
The appropriate response is neither automatic suspicion nor indifference. It is professional accountability grounded in evidence.
Washington Must Take Responsibility
The examples from the Dominican Republic, Panama, Costa Rica, and Sri Lanka point toward a problem larger than any individual employee.
They raise questions about DHR's personnel selection, supervisory practices, handling of workplace complaints, assignment of professional opportunities, and willingness to confront management deficiencies.
The State Department cannot credibly demand greater accountability from foreign-assistance partners while tolerating inadequate accountability within its own operations.
Nor should senior managers assume that the restructuring of USAID automatically produces a better system. A new organizational chart is no guarantee of improved performance. If personnel decisions are made without sufficient attention to qualifications, if workplace complaints go unresolved, or if overseas offices expand without clear operational justification, the same weaknesses that reform was intended to address may persist.
DHR leadership in Washington should undertake a serious review of these concerns. That review should establish whether complaints were properly investigated, whether assignments and promotions followed consistent standards, whether staffing expansions are justified, and whether overseas managers are meeting their responsibilities.
The Department should also draw from a wider pool of qualified personnel, including experienced Foreign Service professionals, former military officers, humanitarian specialists, and individuals with proven records of managing complex international operations.
This is not an argument for excluding former USAID employees. It is an argument against allowing institutional familiarity, personal relationships, or bureaucratic inertia to substitute for merit and performance.
Secretary Rubio's foreign-assistance reforms represent a major opportunity to make American assistance more effective, strategically focused, and accountable to taxpayers.
But the success of those reforms will ultimately be judged by results, not announcements.
If DHR leadership fails to confront credible personnel and management problems now, it risks undermining the very reforms it has been entrusted to implement. The administration deserves better—and so do American taxpayers.
